There is SIM re-registration going on in Ghana now. This is the second time the country is undergoing such a process. This current one is supposed to cure the grave flaws of the first one. But the way things are going now, I have a strong feeling that when another government comes to power they will find justification to redo SIM registration all over again.
Ghana’s first SIM registration was started in 2011. The mantra-in-chief to justify it at the time, was that it was going to help us fight SIM Box fraud, which denied the state and telcos of huge revenue from inbound international calls, and also affected the quality of calls from abroad. But the process had several flaws:
- There was no ID verification system in place, so people registered SIM cards with all kinds of ID cards which could not be verified immediately as real or fake.
- People also used even genuine but stolen ID cards, so several people got SIM cards registered in the names of persons other than the actual user of the SIM card.
- Even the telcos and their agents pre-registered loads and loads of SIM cards and sold them to persons who wanted to avoid the hustle and bustle of going through registration on their own.
- Telcos and their agents also registered thousands of SIM cards in bulk for individuals who ended up using them for fraudulent activities such as SIM Box fraud, and several forms of digital fraud, and no one could easily trace and arrest the owners of these SIM cards.
- Telcos engaged in the mass SIM registrations just to shore up their subscription numbers for whatever reason, including bragging rights.
Red Flag
Prior to the 2011 SIM registration process, however, even the telcos and several civil society organisations raised the red flag about the lack of ID verification system and how that was going to render the whole process futile, but the regulator, National Communications Authority (NCA), backed by the government of the day, did not listen. They maintained their usual suspicious stance that the telcos were up to no good; that they wanted the status quo to remain so they could keep activating SIM cards indiscriminately, just to shore up their subscriptions numbers.
In the end, the telcos wasted a reported US$25 million (at the time) on an exercise that was eventually declared futile as predicted by the voices of reason. It yielded no real dividends whatsoever. In fact SIM Box fraud even became worse and other forms of digital fraud like mobile money fraud and romance fraud also kicked in. NCA then employed third-party entities like GVG, Subah and now Kelni GVG, at different times, to help fight SIM Box because their almighty SIM registration failed to fix the problem.
Deja Vu
Now we are on the second SIM Registration, and the mantra-in-chief this time round is that it is targeted at fighting digital fraud, particularly mobile money fraud, which is very rampant today.
To cure the key challenge with the first one, ie lack of ID verification system, government first built the National Identification System, which led to the issuance of the biometric Ghana Card with a chip that contains all the bio data of the holder, plus the details of other national ID cards such as passport, SSNIT (social security), Voter ID, Driver’s License, and National Health Insurance card. In addition to that the Ghana Card also captures the DIGITAL ADDRESS generated and provided by the applicant. (keep this in mind).
With all those details captured on the Ghana Card, plus the fingerprint of the applicant, government was confident enough to insist that the only ID card eligible for SIM Re-registration is nothing else than the Ghana Card. Indeed, no other national ID captures that much information about the holder like the Ghana Card does.
But, for some strange reason, the Ministry of Communications and the NCA, which insisted on the Ghana Card as the only valid ID, decided that in spite of all the bio-data, ID details and digital address captured on the Ghana Card, they would also capture their own bio data and digital address during SIM Registration. Again, in spite of all the voices of reason that cautioned against it, they insisted on capturing their own bio data using a privately built app. Their reason in chief was that they need that additional bio data to build a ROBUST SIM REGISTER (keep that in mind).
Again the idea of NCA employing the services of a third-party entity to capture our bio data in spite of what the National Identification Authority (NIA), a statutory body under the Interior Ministry had done, was widely and vehemently opposed. But NCA and the sector Minister insisted on collecting our bio data through a questionable third-party App at the cost of GHS5 per SIM in the name of building a robust SIM register. As usual, they called opposers names just to push their intentions through.
Take note that the Communications Ministry and it agency, the NCA are not part of homeland security, unlike the NIA, which is under the Interior Ministry – directly in charge of homeland security. So it was very questionable that the communications ministry and the NCA also collected our bio data separately, when they should be referring to what NIA has. Secondly, NIA collected the data at no cost to us, but NCA said we must pay GHS5 to give them our bio data to store. It does not even make sense. In nearby Nigeria, it was totally free to get National ID and equally free to link your national ID to you SIM card and get you line activated. But the very Ghanaian government which promised to shepherd the economy away from taxation, is the one charging us GHS5 for SIM registration.
Eventually, the second SIM registration process started and, sooner than later, it was gravely hampered by the sloppiness of government sanctioned third-party app for the unnecessary collection of bio data. This caused long queues in the scorching sun for hours, leading to several people abandoning the whole process. Government and the telcos traded subtle punches on what the cause of the slow process was. But eventually several millions have been registered either completely or half way. The government has been threatening to deactivate unregistered and partially registered SIM cards but that has not happened.
As of October 2022, the government told us there were over 42.7 million active SIM cards in the country, out of which 28.9 million had been linked to Ghana Cards, representing 67.28%. Of that number, a little over 18.9 million had been fully registered (bio data captured) – representing 44.28% of the total SIM cards issued and 69.64% of SIM cards linked to Ghana Cards. By now the numbers should be up.
So, clearly there is significant progress in the ongoing SIM Registration process, and it would be fair to expect that by now we should be seeing some dividends in terms of the fight against mobile money fraud in particular. But as we speak, mobile money fraud is still going on unabated, as if SIM registration is not even here. What is even worse is that mobile money fraudsters are now using numbers within the newly issued number blocks on MTN – like 059, 025 and the most recent 053 numbers to commit fraud. 053 numbers in particular were released long after the start of SIM registration, so one wonders how fraudsters could activate 053 numbers and use them for fraud.
There is no way anyone could activate 053 numbers without going through the current SIM registration process, which is supposed to capture Ghana Card details and the bio data of the SIM holder. But 053 numbers registered in names like Ruth Bondzie, Gifty Agyir and others, are being used by fraudsters to make moves on their victims.
Fraudulent Registrations
But the big question is whether the names used in registering those numbers were actually the names of the actual users of the numbers? For instance, the person who used the 053 bearing the name of Ruth Bondzie to try and defraud an MTN MoMo customer called George Nartey was male, and yet he used a phone number bearing the name of a female. Another person who slid into my WhatsApp using a 053 number with the name Gifty Agyir could actually be a guy trying romance fraud on me.
Let’s stick with Ruth Bondzie. There are two possibilities here – either the user of the number stole the phone of Ruth Bondzie and tried to use it to defraud someone just to get Ruth Bondzie into trouble, or the SIM was fraudulently registered and activated for that fraudster using Ruth Bondzie’s Ghana Card and bio data details. Ordinary, one would just stick with the first scenario, but three recent incidents of fraudulent inside jobs indicate the second scenario is actually the case.
Identity Theft – 3 cases
Often when you say telco staff are complicit in airtime loot, mobile money fraud and or the things that facilitate same, the telcos pretend they only employ saints – and make it look like their staff are not capable of fraud. The telcos also create the impression that they have full proof systems in place to prevent any staff from doing any such thing without being caught on first attempt. But we all know that cannot be true, otherwise why would the police complain that telcos often put stumbling blocks in their way when police investigations into mobile money fraud is beginning to point to telco staff?
Here is what an AirtelTigo customer found recently regarding the use of his Ghana Card and bio data to register seven SIM cards from for people he does not know without his consent. The customer, a chief, had registered three SIM cards with his Ghana Card. He then tried to register a fourth number on AirtelTigo for business, knowing very well that he had the opportunity to register a maximum of ten numbers with his card. But he got feedback that he could not register anymore numbers.
The chief then contacted a friend who had worked with Airtel at manager level before for assistance. The friend led him to the head office of AirtelTigo, only to find that seven other SIM cards have been registered and linked to his Ghana Card without his consent.
We all know that when you register a SIM Card, you need to be present for your bio data to be captured for every single SIM card. That is the rule. In fact when I transferred my late mum’s phone number into my name at the time she was too weak to go through SIM registration, I was told that I need to be present for my bio data to be captured again because the bio data captured for SIM registration does not sit with telcos – it goes straight to the NCA through their private app so the telco cannot link the previously captured bio data to the new number. Same thing happened when I registered my TurboNet number.
But in this case the chief was never present and yet his Ghana Card details and bio data were linked to seven phone numbers that do not belong to him, and they were given to people he does not know from anywhere.
As if that was not enough, popular Ghanaian media personality, Kofi Adomah also went to MTN recently and checked what numbers were linked to his Ghana Card and, according to him, what he found was scary. He wrote on social media that he will spew out the details soon. Another Facebooker called Stevyn Laweh’s Daily, also made a post and detailed how he had challenges with two MTN lines and when he visited MTN’s office he was told he had exhausted ten numbers and some of the numbers are conflicting. He found out that seven strange numbers have been linked o his Ghana Card without his consent.
So, the question begging for answers is if the telcos say the bio data they capture during SIM registration does not sit with them, how did they get access to the chief’s, Kofi Adomah’s and Stevyn’s bio data and linked them to those numbers while the chief, Kofi and Stevyn were not present for their bio data to be captured? How come those numbers were activated without being flagged as having no fresh bio data captured for them?
Clearly, the supposed saintly telco staff and agents are engaged in unsaintly SIM registration, which is fuelling mobile money fraud, and threatening to put innocent people into trouble. Ordinarily, if any of these numbers are used for fraud, the system will trace them back to the innocent chief, Kofi Adomah and Stevyn even though they were not party to the linking of their details to those numbers.
Robust or Bogus SIM Register?
Remember that the NCA said they needed to capture their own set of bio data to ensure the SIM register is ROBUST. Those were their words. Now how can they convince anyone, with these fraudulent SIM registration going on without the NCA’s system flagging them, that they are actually building a robust and a not another bogus SIM register?
Secondly, how can the SIM register be robust when it, like the Ghana Card, is dependent on a potentially flawed Digital Street Addresses generated by applicants themselves without any verification? The digital address system allows anyone to stand anywhere – under a tree, in a bush and even in someone else’s house or office and generate a street address and claim that is his house/office address. There is no address verification system in place – what the applicant provides is what is captured on both Ghana Card and in the SIM register. So how can we rely on that to claim that we are building a robust SIM register to easily trace people to their addresses in case of fraud?
The government and its agencies are fully aware there are critical flaws in the process they sold to us as full proof, but sometimes it appears they have interests other than that of the public in rolling out some of these policies and doing any and everything to whip everyone into line. In this case, one of the main interest is the money they will rake in from charging GHS5 per SIM from telcos just to line the pockets of some people with vested interest.
As I stated in the opening paragraph, I am strongly inclined to believe that if this government does not fix these flaws and anomalies, this whole thing will be redone by another government in the near future and millions of dollars would have gone down the drain again. Already, telcos are paying ghs5 to NCA for each SIM card registered. Multiply that by the number of SIM cards and you know NCA and it’s cohorts in the private sector have a lot of money to share.
My suggestion
NCA must, as a matter of urgency create a universal short code for each Ghanaian phone user to be able to check what SIM cards/phone numbers are linked to their Ghana Card. The service on that short code should be robust enough to allow Ghanaians to be able to either report and or deactivate strange numbers linked to their cards.
Closely related to that, there should be a provision for an sms message to be sent to the primary number linked to any Ghana Card, once a new number is added to the owner’s pool. That way, he/she would know and blow the alarm if any strange number linked to his or her card. This should help clear all the fraudulent SIMs linked to people’s cards. In fact, even for all existing numbers, the telcos should be mandated to send SMS to all the primary numbers and list all numbers linked to the same Ghana Card.
Meanwhile, ahead of whatever measures NCA must put in place to stem the fraudulent SIM registration, you as a phone user also owe it a duty to yourself to go to the offices of your telco and find out what numbers are linked to your Ghana Card. Be sure you know each number linked to your card. If you find any strange numbers linked to your card, write all the numbers down, then report it to the NCA and get the telco to delink them from your Ghana Card. From time to time make a call to those numbers and check if they are still active. You can also check by using the mobile money Apps or short codes, if any of those numbers are still in your name.
I also think that if NCA claims the new SIM register is robust, then it should be able to automatically flag any attempt to link an already captured bio data for one SIM card, to another SIM card. I am also beginning to question the truth in the telcos’ claim that the bio data they capture for SIM registration goes directly to NCA and never sits with the telco. That needs to be investigated.
Finally, the police should come in and start arresting people involved in this identity theft for questioning. It is a crime. I want to believe that whichever device is used in registering a SIM and on what date, can be traced to the person who did the registration. Those people at the telcos must be picked up for questioning, and the telcos whose workers are found to have committed the crime must be sanctioned as entities. If we don’t do that this crime will continue even after all the noise.
We leave it here. The rest is for the duty bearers. But this just the beginning of a new campaign to clean the system for our common good. Someone must do it. I choose to do it.
